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Abstract
This article aims to deepen scholarly understanding of the
Law and Society Movement (L&S) and thereby strengthen
debates about the relation between Empirical Legal Studies
(ELS) and L&S. The article departs from the observation that
ELS, understood as an initiative that emerged in American
law schools in the early 2000s, has been quite successful in
generating more attention to the empirical study of law and
legal institutions in law schools, both in- and outside the US.
In the early years of its existence, L&S – another important
site for the empirical study of law and legal institutions –
also had its center of gravity inside the law schools. But over
time, it shifted towards the social sciences. This article dis-
cusses how that happened, and more in general explains
how L&S became ever more diverse in terms of substance,
theory and methods.
1 Introduction
In 2001, Theodore Eisenberg published a review on the
emergence of Empirical Legal Studies (ELS), in which
he explained how ELS brought a great deal of empirical
scholarship on law and legal institutions back into the
law schools.1 He observed, ‘much of the empirical study
of law was segmented across varying disciplines with no
center […] The growth of ELS has given law-related
empirical scholarship a center, albeit a diffuse center, in
law schools’.2 Eisenberg’s observation, regarding the
segmentation of law-related empirical scholarship,
prompts questions about the pre-ELS era. Why was
empirical scholarship on law and legal institutions seg-
mented across disciplines? And has it always been this
way?
In answering these questions, this article focuses on the
evolution of the Law and Society Movement (L&S) – an
important alternative site for the empirical study of law
and legal institutions. The article notes that L&S, at the
time of its emergence, also had its centre of gravity
inside the law schools. Over time, that centre gradually
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1. T. Eisenberg, The Origins, Nature, and Promises of Empirical Legal Stud-
ies and a Response to Concerns’ 5 University of Illinois Law Review
(2011) 171.
2. Eisenberg, above n. 1, at 1719.
moved away from law schools towards the social scien-
ces. We explain why the shift occurred and how the
movement became ever more diverse in terms of sub-
stance, theory and methods.
But the article does not stop there. In effectively contri-
buting to debates about the relationship between ELS
and L&S, the paper observes that L&S, in spite of its
enormous breadth and diversity, has not been without
boundaries or direction. In the article, we identify a par-
ticular set of traits that characterise L&S. Consideration
of these traits is useful not only for deepening our
understanding of L&S but also for reflecting on the
nature and character of ELS, in the Netherlands and
beyond.
Two words of caution are in order at this point. First,
we do not aim to provide a complete overview of the
evolution of the L&S. Instead, relying on a combination
of past reviews, presidential addresses3 and interviews
with leading L&S scholars,4 we highlight several pro-
cesses and turning points that contributed to the nature
of L&S. Second, in reflecting on the evolution of L&S,
we focus on developments in the United States. We
acknowledge the fact that very valuable socio-legal work
has occurred outside the United States. But we also
observe that North American scholarship has been dom-
inant in the evolution of the L&S.
Finally, there is a need for clarification of the label ELS,
or at least how it is understood in the context of this
article. We understand ELS as a movement that
emerged in American law schools in the early 2000s.
Like the L&S, ELS is interdisciplinary in nature. But as
several scholars have noted, unlike L&S, the centre of
gravity of ELS lies chiefly within the law schools.5 Fur-
thermore, ELS is often characterised as a movement
3. Presidential addresses of the Law & Society Association (LSA) do not
perfectly reflect the field. Sometimes the ‘projects’ that presidents imag-
ine are not in line with the ‘practice’ of Law-and-Society scholarship.
See R.L. Abel, ‘Law and Society: Project and Practice’, 6 Annual Review
of Law and Social Science (2010) 1, at 5. That said, we also observe
that the selection of a president with a specific profile and at a particular
point in time – partly – reflects the interests of law-and-society mem-
bers at that moment. Furthermore, we notice that law-and-society pres-
idents use their knowledge of the field to shape their addresses. The
addresses thus offer a glimpse into wider debates in L&S over time.
4. These interviews have been conducted by UC Berkeley’s Center for the
Study of Law & Society, and are available at: https:// www. law. berkeley.
edu/ centers/ center -for -the -study -of -law -society/ conversations -in -law -
and -society/ (accessed on July 18, 2018).
5. Eisenberg, above n. 1; see also M. Suchman and E. Mertz, ‘Towards a
New Legal Empiricism: Empirical Legal Studies and New Legal Realism’,
6 Annual Review of Law and Social Science (2010) 555, at 556.
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with a preference for positivist and quantitative
research.6
Outside the United States, ELS sometimes seems to be
defined more broadly, to incorporate all empirical
research conducted on law and legal institutions. This
broader definition allows for a diverse set of scholars to
be brought under a single umbrella. It is inclusive and
helps connect researchers. But to make sense of the dif-
ferent approaches to empirical scholarship, a narrower
definition of ELS, like the one adopted in this article,
can be useful. Such a definition enables identification of
commonalities and differences across the field. Identifi-
cation of these properties can in turn help us advance
empirical research on law and legal institutions as a
whole.
2 Origins
Law and Society shares its intellectual roots with ELS.
Both movements can be traced back to the beginning of
the twentieth century when legal scholars in Europe and
the United States started to move beyond a purely doc-
trinal study of law. In Europe, we observe how collabo-
ration between legal scholars and social scientists inten-
sified as a result of the expansion of the administrative
state. This collaboration served to increase the effective-
ness and efficiency of policy and law, both instruments
of social control.7
In the United States, where Sociological Jurisprudence
and Legal Realism gained traction, legal scholars also
developed an interest in the impact of law. But in doing
so, they mainly focused on the effect of judicial deci-
sions.8 In addition, legal realists wanted to better under-
stand the human determinants of court rulings. Contra-
ry to the belief that these decisions were the outcome of
mechanical application of legal principles to actual cases,
legal realists argued that judicial decisions were made by
human beings who were themselves subject to all kinds
of norms, beliefs and emotions that affected the out-
come of particular cases.9
6. Theodore Eisenberg, one of the founders of ELS, explained how ELS
‘helps the study of law and the legal system to join part of a larger
probabilistic revolution […] ELS employs a methodology that is usually,
but not always, the methodology of statistical analysis’. See Eisenberg,
above n. 1, at 1719, emphasis added. See also E. Chambliss, ‘When do
Facts Persuade? Some Thoughts on the Market for “Empirical Legal
Studies”’, 71 Law and Contemporary Problems (2008) 17, at 24; Such-
man and Mertz, above n. 5, at 558.
7. M. M. Feeley, ‘Three Voices of Socio-Legal Studies’, 35 Israel Law
Review (2001) 175, at 177-78.
8. N.E.H. Hull, ‘Reconstructing the Origins of Realistic Jurisprudence: A
Prequel to the Llewellyn-Pound Exchange over Legal Realism’, 38 Duke
Law Journal (1989), 1302, at 1305-08; B. Tamanaha, ‘A Vision of
Social-Legal Change: Rescuing Ehrlich from “Living Law”’, 36 Law and
Social Inquiry (2011) 197, at 303, 305-8.
9. E. White, ‘From Sociological Jurisprudence to Realism: Jurisprudence
and Social Change in Early Twentieth-Century America’, 58 Virginia
Law Review (1972) 999; see also B. Leiter, ‘American Legal Realism’, in
M.P. Golding and W.A. Edmundson (eds.), The Blackwell Guide to the
Philosophy of Law and Legal Theory (2005) 50; J. Skolnick, ‘The Sociol-
Legal Realism influenced legal education and had an
impact on debates in legal theory. Yet its impact on
American jurisprudence waned after World War II. In
the early 1960s, some scholars started to demonstrate
renewed interest in the study of law and society and set
up the Law and Society Association (LSA) in 1964. The
Association, its annual meeting, and its flagship journal
– the Law & Society Review, launched in 1966 –
allowed for further and ‘routinized intellectual
exchange’ on questions related to the interaction
between law and society.10 Four factors appear to have
contributed to the renewed interest in law and society
and the establishment of the LSA: (a) heightened
respect for social sciences; (b) the civil rights movement
and the war on poverty; (c) funding opportunities; and
(d) an awareness that law-on-the-books was not the
same as law-in-action.
Increasing respect for the social sciences surfaced after
World War II. Indeed, ‘[b]y the end of World War II,
the social sciences had become a respectable third wing
of U.S. higher education’.11 Advances in survey
research, many of which occurred during the war, had
allowed the social sciences to further position them-
selves as an enterprise similar to the physical sciences.
In searching for universal behavioural laws or regulari-
ties, social science increased its standing and became an
important instrument for policymaking.12
The link between social science and policy was also
appealing to many of the early members of the L&S
who were committed to addressing societal problems –
most notably, problems related to the civil rights move-
ment, the war on poverty, and crime.13 From the per-
spective of legal scholars, collaboration with the social
sciences allowed for sounder policy and judicial deci-
sion-making. From the perspective of social scientists,
attention to law and policy was important for the defini-
tion of meaningful questions and for the employment of
research output in useful ways.14
The actualisation of these normative commitments was
facilitated by unprecedented institutional opportuni-
ties.15 The Russell Sage Foundation, the Walter
E. Meyer Research Institute, the Ford Foundation and
the American Bar Foundation stimulated and funded
entire research centres and other new research initia-
tives. Influential hubs for law-and-society research,
ogy of Law in America: Overview and Trends’, 13 Social Problems
(1965) 4, at 7.
10. F.J. Levine, ‘Goose Bumps and “The Search for Signs of Intelligent Life”
in Sociolegal Studies: After Twenty-five Years’, 24 Law and Society
Review (1990) 7, at 10.
11. S.S. Silbey, ‘Law and Society Movement’, in H.M. Kritzer (ed.), Legal
Systems of the World: A Political, Social and Cultural Encyclopedia
(2002) 860, at 861.
12. B. Garth and J. Sterling, ‘From Legal Realism to Law and Society:
Reshaping Law for the Last Stages of the Social Activist State’, 32 Law
and Society Review (1998) 409, at 412.
13. Abel, above n. 3, at 3.
14. See generally Garth and Sterling, above n. 12.
15. A more opportunistic reading of this episode suggests that some of the
early law-and-society scholars were drawn into the movement in part
because of the openings that emerged. See Garth and Sterling, above
n. 12.
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which emphasised interdisciplinary training and
exchange, emerged in Berkeley, Denver, Northwestern,
Yale and Wisconsin.16
Several leading L&S scholars who were interviewed for
the Conversations in Law & Society lecture series
(CiL&S), organised and published by University of Cal-
ifornia, Berkeley’s Center for the Study of Law & Soci-
ety, also signalled frustration with contemporaneous
scholarship in law schools. Lawrence Friedman and
Joseph Gusfield argued that the study of black-letter-
law was too limited, partly in light of discrepancies
between ‘what the law said and what people were
doing’. Laura Nader pointed out that she ‘felt lonely in
the law schools’. And Steward Macaulay observed that
there was a need to make law schools ‘a more critical
place’.
3. Evolution
In the early years of the L&S, collegial relations existed
between lawyers and social scientists. Tensions were
nonetheless present. ‘Social scientists and lawyers were
at times allies, but they also competed to define and to
gain ascendancy over the new social expertise’.17 In the
1970s, concerns of legal scholars started to dominate the
debate. At the time, ‘the center of gravity of the field
moved toward law, leaving the social science disciplines
for the most part outside’.18 Rita James Simon, one of the
early members of the LSA board, similarly explained
that social scientists ‘were still considered handmaidens
and sort of technicians that had to supply just very tech-
nical answers to legal scholars who would then (1) frame
the problem and (2) analyze what the data really
meant’.19
3.1 Gap Studies
The central role of gap studies in early law-and-society
scholarship was illustrative of the dominance of legal
concerns during the 1960s and 1970s.20 Building on
legal realism, many law-and-society scholars focused on
the identification and understanding of gaps between
law-on-the-books and law-in-action.21 This focus was
importantly informed by the legal – not social science –
assumption that law-on-the-books and law-in-action are
generally aligned.22 Until today, scholars both within
and outside L&S associate law-and-society research
with the study of law-in-action.23 To illustrate, Macau-
lay’s renowned article on the (non)use of law between
16. Garth and Sterling, above n. 12.
17. Garth and Sterling, above n. 12, at 412.
18. Garth and Sterling, above n. 12, at 409, emphasis added.
19. Quoted in Abel, above n. 3, at 3; cf. Feeley, above n. 7, at 184.
20. R.L. Abel, ‘Law Books and Books About Law’, 26 Stanford Law Review
(1973) 175; Feeley, above n. 7.
21. J.B. Gould and S. Barclay, ‘Mind the Gap: The Place of Gap Studies in
Sociolegal Scholarship’, 8 Annual Review of Law and Social Science
(2012) 323, at 324-25.
22. Abel, above n. 20, at 185-86.
23. e.g., S. Macaulay, L. Friedman and E. Mertz, Law in Action: A Socio-
Legal Reader (2007).
contract parties – a classical gap study – is frequently
used as an example of law-and-society research.24
The popularity of gap studies, in the early years of the
L&S, also emerged from desires for social engineering.
Law played an important role in that scheme; law hel-
ped the state realise its engineering objectives.25 But
sometimes, law did not realise those objectives. Evalua-
tion in the form of ‘legal policy research’ was then called
for.26 But there were also other forms of gap studies,
including research that focused on the manifestation of
unintended (side)-effects of law.27
In the mid-1970s, critiques on gap studies slowly started
to emerge from within L&S itself. One of the staunchest
critics, Richard Abel, argued that the central assump-
tion underlying gap studies – the assumption that social
behaviour is commonly in line with legal prescripts –
was problematic. He observed, ‘Why should we expect
harmony between law and behavior rather than some
other relationship – dissonance, for instance, or a purely
accidental conjunction?’28 Abel reasoned that the
assumption of harmony made sense in an era in which
‘[l]egislation [still] expressed and clarified values already
immanent in the society [and when] adjudication merely
reasserted the values enunciated by previous judges’.29
But during a time in which ‘the actions of those who do
govern must be seen as making a difference, a difference
phrased in terms of the realization of goals, not just the
expression of values’, the assumption was less obvious.30
In an interview for Berkley’s Conversations in Law and
Society, Susan Silbey also argued against gap studies.
But she did so for a different reason. Where Richard
Abel pointed out that a gap between law-on-the-books
and law-in-action is common and not surprising – and,
therefore, not clearly worth documenting as such – Sus-
an Silbey observed that many citizens do comply with
the law, and that scholars should pay more attention to
compliance rather than non-compliance. She explained,
We were so preoccupied with the gap that we weren’t
paying attention to the meaning, we weren’t paying
attention to what happens except in that gap. And so
it seems to me that the turn that had happened in the
scholarship was to notice that in fact what things are
called and how they are called is part of their effects,
not just the behavior. So it was sort of a step aside.
By looking at the gap, we were looking at the tails of
the distribution. What we needed, the next thing, we
needed to look at the hump. Why do most people go
along […] Most of the work following was about the
24. S. Macaulay, ‘Non-Contractual Relations in Business: A Preliminary
Study’, 28 American Sociological Review (1963) 55. In this article,
Macaulay explained that business partners generally make little use of
legal sanctions in planning commercial exchanges and in solving com-
mercial disputes. Macaulay thus challenged a central assumption of
law-on-the-books – the assumption that the law governed these kinds
of exchanges and disputes.
25. Feeley, above n. 7, at 178.
26. Feeley, above n. 7, at 184.
27. See also Gould and Barclay, above n. 21.
28. Abel, above n. 20, at 185.
29. Abel, above n. 20, at 186.
30. Abel, above n. 20, at 186.
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meanings system and the circulating narratives and
schemers are what encourage the compliance, the
conformity or the legitimacy of the law (emphasis
added).
These and other critiques on gap studies contributed to
shifts, from legal concerns to social science concerns, in
the L&S.
3.2 Formal Legal Institutions
A second way in which the dominance of legal concerns
transpired in the early years concerned the main objects
of investigation: formal legal institutions. Most research
focused on the operation of courts, lawyers, juries and,
to a lesser extent, the police. In search of a law-and-soci-
ety canon, Carol Seron and Susan Silbey tellingly indi-
cate, ‘Students of law and society have historically pur-
sued the study of law-in-action in (1) courts, (2) law-
yers’ offices, (3) juries, (4) regulatory agencies, (5) police
work, (6) citizens’ interactions with those legal actors
and agencies’.31 In his 1986 presidential address, Stew-
art Macaulay lamented the preoccupation with legal
actors and thus implicitly underlined that focus. He
argued:
My case is very simple: I’ll argue that we must look
beyond the behavior of judges, lawyers, cops, crooks,
and eyewitnesses as well as data concerning how
many of what kinds of cases come before the courts.
We need to understand the behavior of people who
comply with or shade and evade the law. We need to
consider when and why people turn to lawyers or use
other means of solving problems. We need to under-
stand what conduct by legal officials people will
applaud or tolerate. To understand these and other
things, we must understand people’s knowledge of
and attitudes toward the legal system.32
4 Transition
Critiques by Macaulay, Abel and like-minded scholars
from L&S arguably helped gradually shift the emphasis
in research away from the concerns and interests of legal
scholars to those of social scientists. But these critiques
were not the only sources that triggered change. Trans-
formations of the political landscape and developments
in the philosophy of science were equally important.
4.1 Change in the Political Landscape
The L&S emerged at a time in which governance in the
United States was undergoing important change. The
state was making ever more attempts at controlling and
directing the behaviour of its citizens; the state became
31. C. Seron and S.S. Silbey ‘Profession, Science and Culture: An Emergent
Canon of Law and Society Research’, in A. Sarat (ed.), The Blackwell
Companion to Law and Society (2004) 30, at 35.
32. S. Macaulay, ‘Images of Law in Everyday Life: The Lessons of School,
Entertainment, and Spectator Sports’, 21 Law and Society Review
(1987) 185, at 186, emphasis added.
more ‘activist’, both at the national and at the local level.
In this context, law-and-society scholars could play an
important role, helping governments develop laws and
policies in support of their attempts at social engineer-
ing.33 Through their work many socio-legal scholars
tried to contribute to progressive social change and tack-
le problems like poverty, drugs and racism.34
Under the Reagan- and Bush administrations, the desire
to support political leaders changed. Abel explains,
‘Eight years of Reagan and four of George H.W. Bush
coincided with a major shift in the L&S project. With
conservatives in the White House (and increasingly the
federal judiciary), there was less interest than earlier in
increasing the efficacy of law’.35 Law-and-society schol-
ars, mostly liberal, were critical of the political establish-
ment, and started to emphasise and study the – some-
times – ineffective nature of law and policy. In his wide-
ly discussed work The Hollow Hope, Gerald Rosenberg,
for instance, showed great scepticism about the possibil-
ity for social change through litigation.36
4.2 Developments in the Philosophy of Science
Along with the changing political landscape we could
also observe developments in the philosophy of science:
postmodernism and critical legal studies gained ground
at the expense of positivism. Looking back at the late
1970s, Michael McCann argued, ‘The prevailing mode
of inquiry in the early decades was gap studies […]
Then, in the late 1970s, several waves of critical theory
[…] began to interrogate the promises of rights in more
analytically ambitious ways’.37 Lynn Mather similarly
observed, ‘By the 1980s, law and society critics of positi-
vism raised serious challenges to the [positivist] para-
digm and articulated postrealist, interpretive, and con-
stitutive approaches to law’.38 And in 1984, David Tru-
bek published an article with the revealing title ‘Where
the Action is: Critical Legal Studies and Empiricism’.
Critical and postmodern approaches to the empirical
study of law and legal institutions were particularly
prevalent at the University of Massachusetts, where
scholars such as Patricia Ewick, Sally Merry, Austin
Sarat, Susan Silbey and Barbara Yngvesson were run-
ning the Amherst Seminar on Legal Ideology and Legal
Process. The program of the Amherst Seminar stimula-
ted serious reflection on the practice of socio-legal stud-
ies.39 Members of the seminar called for interpretive
work and argued against narrow positivism. Susan Sil-
33. J. Simon, ‘Law after Society’, 24 Law and Social Inquiry (1999) 143, at
145-46.
34. See also M. Galanter, ‘Presidential Address: The Legal Malaise; Or, Jus-
tice Observed’, 19 Law and Society Review (1985) 537, at 538-39.
35. Abel, above n. 3, at 8.
36. G. Rosenberg, The Hollow Hope: Can Courts Bring About Social
Change? (1991).
37. M. McCann, ‘The Unbearable Lightness of Rights: On Sociolegal Inqui-
ry in the Global Era’, 48 Law and Society Review (2014) 245, at, 246.
38. L. Mather, ‘Reflections on the Reach of Law (and Society) Post 9/11: an
American Superhero?’, 37 Law and Society Review (2003) 263.
39. See for example C. Harrington and B. Yngvesson, ‘Interpretive Sociole-
gal Research’, 15 Law and Social Inquiry (1990) 135; D. Trubek and
J. Esser, ‘Critical Empiricism in American Legal Studies: Paradox, Pro-
gram, or Pandora’s Box?’, 14 Law and Social Inquiry (1989) 3.
137
Daniel Blocq & Maartje van der Woude doi: 10.5553/ELR.000105 - ELR november 2018 | No. 2
bey and Austin Sarat furthermore argued, ‘At the same
time that we have been insisting on bringing sociology
to law, we have done less well attending to the forces
that frame our descriptions of legal institutions and their
environments. We have not done very well at promoting
a sociology of the sociology of law’.40
During these years, in which the Amherst Seminar was
rather dominant in law-and-society research, many
studies on legal discourse and legal ideology emerged.41
Furthermore, research on interpretive action and legal
consciousness flourished.42
5 The ‘Big Tent’
By the early nineties, L&S had transformed into an
interdisciplinary and methodologically eclectic move-
ment – sometimes referred to as a pluralistic association
or a ‘big tent’,43 which ‘is getting bigger all the time’.44
It is clear that there are different opinions with regard to
the size of the LSA tent. In discussing the values of the
LSA, Howard Erlanger illustrated the eclecticism. After
asking himself, ‘What are the values that characterize
the LSA?’ he explained:
We are committed to each other and to the develop-
ment of the field, even though we are not always sure
what ‘the field’ is. We are a community that is open
to new theories, methods, and substantive topics.
And we are a community that seeks to be welcoming
to new scholars and to those who aren’t the predomi-
nantly white, male, U.S.-based scholars who founded
LSA. Although we may not always get it right and
more work remains to be done, I believe that the his-
tory of LSA as an institution is the history of a com-
mitment to these values.45
Many scholars within the L&S indeed appear to have
embraced the inclusiveness.46 Lynn Mather, for
instance, also observed, ‘A strength of law and society
has been its inclusivity and openness to new perspec-
tives, whether disciplinary, theoretical or methodologi-
40. Silbey and Sarat, ‘Critical Traditions in Law and Society Research’, 21
Law and Society Review (1987) 165, at 165-66.
41. See for example J. Conley and W. O’Barr, Rules Versus Relationships:
The Ethnography of Legal Discourse (1990); L. Mather and B. Yngves-
son, ‘Language, Audience, and the Transformation of Disputes’, 15 Law
and Society Review (1980-81) 775; S.E. Merry, Getting Justice and
Getting Even: Legal Consciousness among Working Class Americans
(1990); A. Sarat and W.L.F. Felstiner, ‘Law and Strategy in the Divorce
Lawyer’s Office’, 20 Law and Society Review (1986) 93.
42. See generally S.S. Silbey, ‘After Legal Consciousness’, 1 Annual Review
of Law and Social Science (2005) 323.
43. H.S. Erlanger, ‘Organizations, Institutions, and the Story of Shmuel:
Reflections on the 40th Anniversary of the Law and Society Associa-
tion’, 39 Law and Society Review (2005) 1.
44. M. Friedman, ‘Coming of Age: Law and Society Enters an Exclusive
Club’, 1 Annual Review of Law and Social Science (2005) 1, at 2.
45. Erlanger, above n. 43, at 4.
46. See D.M. Engel, ‘Making Connections: Law and Society Researchers
and Their Subjects’, 33 Law and Society Review (1999) 3; Erlanger,
above n. 43, at 6; Galanter, above n. 34, at 537-38.
cal’.47 The many presidential calls for further expansion
through issues such as inclusion of international schol-
ars and consideration of issues pertinent to those schol-
ars,48 through attention to new themes like violence,49
and by calling for more activist and policy-oriented
work exemplify the appreciation of inclusiveness.50
As mentioned, not all law-and-society scholars have
appreciated the increasing breadth or inclusiveness of
the movement. To some it has been a cause for concern.
In the same address in which Erlanger celebrated diver-
sity, he also observed, ‘All this is not to say that valuing
diversity in scholarly style is cost-free […] we have val-
ued breadth over focus and parsimony […] To the
extent that law and society seeks to be an independent
discipline with its own theory and methods, there will
be pressure to define a much more focused core, and to
set boundaries.’51 In a review of Kitty Calavita’s Invita-
tion to Law & Society: An Introduction to the Study of
Real Law,52 Austin Sarat bemoaned the state of affairs,
writing
In the late 1980s, I enthusiastically participated in a
set of meta-debates about the nature of law and soci-
ety as an intellectual endeavour and about the direc-
tions that law and society research might most profit-
ably take […] At that time, it still seemed meaningful
to talk about a law and society paradigm and to refer
to law and society as a ‘movement.’ Two decades lat-
er it no longer seems appropriate to do so. Even as
the field has flourished, the law and society paradigm
has decomposed. What was a paradigm is now what
Kitty Calavita […] rightly refers to as a ‘perspective.’
What was a movement has become what she refers to
as a ‘mentality’.53
The increasingly eclectic nature of the L&S has spurred
the emergence of new factions, associations and jour-
nals. Law-and-society scholars with a stronger interpre-
tivist bent started the Association for the Study of Law,
Culture and Humanities in 1998, and launched the jour-
nal Law, Culture and Humanities in 2005. Some law-
and-society scholars with a preference for positivist and
quantitative work co-initiated or jumped on the band-
wagon of ELS. These initiatives have not necessarily led
to an abandonment of the LSA. Instead, we find emi-
nent scholars, such as Valerie Hans and Austin Sarat,
taking up positions of leadership in different associa-
tions.
47. Mather, above n. 38, at 278.
48. Mather, above n. 38.
49. C.J. Greenhouse, ‘Tuning to a Key of Gladness’, 32 Law and Society
Review (1998) 1.
50. C. Seron, ‘The Two Faces of Law and Inequality: From Critique to the
Promise of Situated, Pragmatic Policy’, 50 Law and Society Review
(2016) 9.
51. Erlanger, above n. 43, at 8.
52. K. Calavita, Invitation to Law and Society: An Introduction to the Study
of Real Law (2010).
53. A. Sarat, ‘From Movement to Mentality, From Paradigm to Perspective,
From Action to Performance: Law and Society at Mid-Life’, 39 Law and
Social Inquiry (2014) 217, at 218.
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6 Characteristic Traits
In spite of its diversity, L&S is not without direction.
The movement has several characteristic traits, some of
which are precisely about diversity – a conscious and
very deliberate diversity. We discuss three traits below.
A fourth trait, involving the space that L&S offers for
both positivist and interpretivist work, emerged in the
previous discussion on developments in the philosophy
of science.
6.1 State Law, Non-State Law and Informal
Rules
Attention to state law and formal legal institutions has
always been central to law-and-society scholarship. But
over time, scholarly interest in non-state law increased.
To be sure, non-state law was a principal object of
investigation in legal anthropology already before the
organisation of the LSA. But in the early years, legal
anthropologists were not as visible and influential in the
formal organisation of the L&S as they would later
become.54
The increasing prominence of legal anthropologists in
the L&S, and the expansion of research on legal plural-
ism from colonial contexts – old legal pluralism – to the
developing world – new legal pluralism – paved the way
for or implied a broader approach to the study of law
and legal institutions.55 In her 1989 presidential address,
Felice Levine also reflected on the issue, writing:
The centrality of law has always been an issue of ten-
sion in sociolegal studies […] In order to understand
law, our scholarly work must not only focus on isolat-
ing and explaining patterns of departure from law but
also look at law in different locales. Coming to under-
stand law with a little ‘1’ in everyday lives is consis-
tent with calls that date back to the 1960s and early
1970s […] While the call is not new, it has been
endorsed more readily in principle than in practice.
One explanation of this ambivalence may flow from
the influence of legal scholarship and the apprehen-
sion that a broader definition of boundaries might
strip our incipient field of a field.56
Despite initial concerns about attention to law with a lit-
tle ‘l’, non-state law and informal rules have taken up a
prominent role in contemporary law-and-society schol-
arship.57 The Journal of Legal Pluralism and Unofficial
54. See also Eisenberg, above n. 1, at 1716.
55. S.E. Merry, ‘Legal Pluralism’, 22 Law and Society Review (1988) 869.
56. Levine, above n. 10, at 20-21.
57. As Munger observes, ‘Faithfulness to insight has led law and society
scholars away from studies of liberal legal institutions on their own
terms and toward highly contextualized studies of law in organizations,
in communities, in families, in everyday life. Powered by a critique of
law that decentres or deconstructs the authority of law, law and society
research locates the role of law in the very fabric of social relationships,
consciousness and identities.’ See F. Munger, ‘Presidential Address:
Inquiry and Activism in Law and Society’, 35 Law and Society Review
(2001) 7, at 10-11.
Law and Sally Falk Moore’s widely cited work on semi-
autonomous social fields testify of the role.58
Another arena where we observe an increase in attention
to non-state law is regulation. Past research has shown
that industries sometimes regulate themselves.59 This
self-regulation implies an increase in non-state laws in
companies – an increase that has in turn spurred
research on enforcement and compliance with these
non-state laws (Ibid.).
6.2 Social Justice and Social Change
In addition to consideration of non-state law, we also
observe that social justice became a more central con-
cern. Where the early presidential addresses focused on
formal legal institutions,60 or images of state law,61 we
find that more recent addresses tend to focus on ques-
tions of justice,62 rights,63 oppression and inequality.64
In these addresses, state law and formal legal institu-
tions seem to take a back seat. An (implicit) assumption
is that these issues – state law and formal legal institu-
tions – are at the service of justice and quality. And that
warrants a focus on justice, rights, oppression and
(in)equality as such. In that vein, Michael McCann
reminds us that attention to ‘rights’ is not new within
the L&S, writing
Perhaps no topic, short of law itself, has been more
central to the sociolegal legacy of scholarly inquiry
than that of rights. It is worth remembering that Law
and Society as an intellectual movement and profes-
sional association was born in the era of the U.S. civil
rights movement. The first volume of the Law &
Society Review was published in 1966, when the ink
was still drying on the 1964 Civil Rights Act and
1965 Voting Rights Act. In fact, the first special issue
of LSR in 1967 (Vol. 2, no. 1) was on school desegre-
gation in the United States.65
But in those early years, we also observe a great deal of
work that tries to focus on state law and formal legal
institutions without putting much emphasis on the fair-
ness or justness of those institutions. To illustrate, in his
1982 presidential address, Herbert Jacob emphasised the
need for effectiveness. He argued, ‘To understand
58. Moore 1973.
59. See for example R. Cheit, Setting Safety Standards: Regulation in the
Public and Private Sectors (1990); J. Rees, Reforming the Workplace: A
Study of Self-Regulation in Occupational Safety (1988).
60. See for example Galanter 1985; H. Jacob, ‘Presidential Address: Trial
Courts in the United States: The Travails of Exploration’, 17 Law and
Society Review 407 (1983))
61. Macaulay, above n. 32.
62. S.S. Silbey, ‘“Let Them Eat Cake”: Globalization, Modern Colonialism,
and the Possibilities of Justice’, 31 Law and Society Review (1997) 207.
63. McCann, above n. 37, at 245.
64. R. Lempert, ‘A Personal Odyssey Toward a Theme: Race and Equality in
the United States: 1948–2009’, 44 Law and Society Review (2010)
431.
65. McCann, above n. 37, at 246. Frank Munger also pointed out, ‘The
inception of the law and society field in North America, and in many
other societies, was motivated by a belief in the simple proposition that
law should stand for equality and for justice’. See Munger, above n. 57,
at 7.
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courts is rewarding in its own right, and if we under-
stand them more fully, we might be able to help design
them to do their work more effectively.’ (1983: 419,
emphasis added). The implicit assumption here is that
the objectives underlying the organisation of formal
legal institutions – objectives set by legislators and poli-
cymakers – are unproblematic. And therefore attention
to effectiveness is justified. As law-and-society scholars
started to become more critical of government over
time, questions of effectiveness moved to the back-
ground. Indeed, there are no references to effectiveness
in the more recent presidential addresses.
Law-and-society’s commitment to social justice also
connects to a concern for progressive social change.
This concern does not only manifest itself in research
that is informed by questions related to justice and
equality. It also transpires in calls for policy-oriented
research and engagement with activism,66 that is, calls
for contributing to the resolution of (in)justices identi-
fied in research. The renowned debate between Joel
Handler and Sally Engle Merry illustrates the concern
for progressive social change that binds many – but not
all – law-and-society members.67 In his presidential
address, Handler lamented the increasing dominance of
postmodernism in (law-and-society) research.68 Sally
Merry offered a rejoinder in the presidential address
that came right after.69 Interestingly, the debate was not
about the ontological or epistemological value of post-
modernism per se. Instead, it focused on ‘the value of
postmodernism for transformative politics’.70
6.3 Global North and Global South
Another important characteristic of the L&S concerns
its international orientation. While North American
scholars have been dominant inside the LSA – all past
presidents have been employed by universities in the
United States – L&S scholarship shows considerable
geographical diversity. In 1968, the Law & Society
Review (LSR), the flagship journal of the LSA, devoted
a special issue to ‘Lawyers in Developing Societies with
Particular Reference to India’. In the 1970s, we find
work on excuses to criminal responsibility in East Afri-
ca,71 deviance in Singapore,72 the legal revolution in
Turkey,73 and political leadership and legal change in
Mexico.74 To be sure, most manuscripts in LSR focused
on American law and legal institutions in the 1970s. But
66. (Seron 2016); See Munger, above n. 57.
67. For an exception see S. Liu, ‘Law’s Social Forms: A Powerless Approach
to the Sociology of Law’, 40 Law and Social Inquiry (2015) 1.
68. J.F. Handler, ‘Postmodernism, Protest, and the New Social Movements’,
26 Law and Society Review (1992) 697.
69. S.E. Merry, ‘Resistance and the Cultural Power of Law’, 29 Law and
Society Review (1995) 11.
70. Handler, above n. 68, at 697; see also Merry, above n. 69, at 11.
71. L. Kato, ‘Functional Psychosis and Witchcraft Fears: Excuses to Criminal
Responsibility in East Africa’, 4 Law and Society Review (1970) 385.
72. G. Count-van Manen, ‘A Deviant Case of Deviance: Singapore’, 5 Law
and Society Review (1971) 389.
73. J. Starr and J. Pool, ‘The Impact of a Legal Revolution in Rural Turkey’,
8 Law and Society Review (1974) 533.
74. J.F. Collier, ‘Political Leadership and Legal Change in Zinacantan’, 11
Law and Society Review (1976) 131.
as the above examples and other LSR articles from this
period show, we observe a genuine interest in questions
arising in the Global South, already in the early days of
the L&S. Work of leading scholars within the L&S such
as Sally Falke Moore, Sally Engle Merry, John and Jean
Comaroff and also Marc Galanter obviously illustrate
this early interest in the Global South.
In an interview for Berkeley’s Conversations in Law &
Society, Laura Nader discussed the relevance of such a
global perspective and the need for comparison. She
argued, a bit provocatively, ‘I realized you had to do
comparison. You can’t just look at one place. That’s the
problem with people who study American law [….] Or
the way Europeans look at law. They are very ethnocen-
tric.’ And that ethnocentrism creates obstacles to a full
understanding of the operation of law and legal institu-
tions inside the societies that we as scholars respectively
live in. She observed, ‘You study the Zapatec, and of
course you look in the mirror. That whole notion of
using what you find abroad to look at your own society
permeates my work.’ That notion was probably impor-
tant to many legal anthropologists. But it seems to have
also appealed to political scientists within L&S, many of
whom currently study socio-legal questions in the Glob-
al South.
7 Conclusion
In this article we have offered reflections on the evolu-
tion of law-and-society research. Through these reflec-
tions we made a modest attempt to explain how the
L&S changed from a field in which concerns of legal
scholars and practitioners were prevalent to one in
which social scientists seem to have become more influ-
ential. Presidential addresses and reviews of the L&S
have furthermore shown that the field has become very
interdisciplinary and eclectic in terms of research meth-
odologies. This diversity has been celebrated by some
and bemoaned by others.
The development towards ever more inclusiveness may
result in at least two outcomes for Law and Society. On
the one hand, we can imagine L&S turning into a plat-
form, rather than a unified movement. That platform
would be made up of different voices and audiences.75
The emergence of sub-fields within L&S would, in this
scenario, be appreciated rather than seen as problematic.
The field of L&S would continue to grow and flourish,
without people worrying too much about what this
means for the central scope, core and message of the
scholarship coming out of it. In a second scenario, L&S
would be more sceptical of the diversity. It would strive
75. Malcolm Feeley already observed in 2001 how socio-legal studies
‘speaks with at least three voices […] It speaks as policy analysis, a
handmaiden to law. It also speaks in the traditional language of the
social sciences. Thirdly, it may be gaining a voice of its own, reflecting a
belief that law is a distinct form of ordering that merits its own position
among the scholarly disciplines, separate from both scholarly fields and
the professional concerns of law’. See Feeley, above n. 7, at 175).
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for a common core and a set of relatively well-defined
boundaries of the field. By doing so, L&S could perhaps
play a more prominent and active role in deepening
scholarship. At this stage, it is hard to speculate on the
likelihood of either one of these, and perhaps other, sce-
narios.
We finally hope that this article can contribute to cur-
rent discussions, in the Netherlands and beyond, about
the development of ELS broadly defined, that is, all
scholarship focusing on the study of law and legal insti-
tutions. By offering insights on the character of L&S,
we anticipate a better understanding of L&S, and thus a
debate on the relationship between ELS and L&S that
rests on sound assumptions about L&S. We specifically
hope that this understanding of L&S will bring scholars,
engaged in the empirical study of law and legal institu-
tions, further together. It seems to us that a broad defi-
nition of ELS, which seems to be rather current in the
Netherlands, encompasses a great deal of L&S research.
The characteristic traits of L&S, identified in this arti-
cle, may finally help deepen discussions on the relation-
ship between L&S and ELS. These discussions have, all
too often, revolved around dichotomies such as quanti-
tative versus qualitative or applied versus more funda-
mental. Serious reflection on the L&S traits may enrich
– ELS – debates about empirical research on law and
legal institutions, bring people on opposite sides of the
methodological spectrum together, and bring empirical
scholarship to the next level, both within and outside
the Netherlands.
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